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Abstract: This paper is dealing with mechanisms that can accelerate the global diffusion 
of climate-friendly technologies. The accelerated diffusion of low-carbon technology 
innovation can possibly be achieved by interactive processes such as: (1) mutually 
reinforcing cycles of policy-induced domestic market growth, innovation, and policy 
feedback; (2) lead markets and political lesson-drawing, the reinforced international 
adoption of innovations from pioneer countries; and (3) interaction between the vertical 
and horizontal dynamics in multi-level systems of governance. The three mechanisms are 
not exclusive. They can overlap and reinforce each other. After a theoretical introduction 
they will be described. The empirical focus is on the European system of multi-level 
climate governance. The paper draws some final conclusions for policy makers. 
Keywords: climate policy; innovation/diffusion; multi-level governance; European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
The increase of greenhouse gases and the scientific consensus on the consequences of manmade 
changes to the atmosphere of the Earth is a dramatic challenge to the governance of necessary climate 
mitigation. What is needed is a high speed of technological change towards a low-carbon economy, 
comparable to the industrial revolutions of past centuries, and it can be asked what strategic options  
exist that can accelerate mitigation efforts. Evidence shows that indeed, there have been cases of 
accelerated change in the last decade. The international diffusion of renewable energy technologies is a 
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prominent example. This paper deals with mechanisms that can accelerate the diffusion of  
climate-friendly technologies. 
Three types of interactive processes seem to be interesting in this regard: 
(1) Mutually reinforcing cycles: the interactive reinforcement of policy-induced domestic market 
growth, induced innovation, and policy feedback. 
(2) Reinforced international diffusion of innovations from pioneer countries, which can be both  
(a) the diffusion of low-carbon technologies from lead-markets and (b) the diffusion of the 
supporting policy resulting from “lesson-drawing” by other countries. 
(3) Reinforced diffusion by multi-level governance: Multi-level governance can stimulate vertical 
and horizontal learning at all levels of the global system. This has become particularly relevant 
regarding horizontal dynamics on the sub-national level being induced by higher levels. 
These mechanisms are characterized by a multi-factorial interactive reinforcement of innovation 
and diffusion processes. A reinforced diffusion of climate-friendly technology can be observed at 
different levels of the multi-level system of global governance. The following analysis will refer to 
selected cases of best practice (a pragmatic methodological decision, which excludes the discussion 
of failures). 
2. Economic and Political Mechanisms of Accelerated Diffusion 
Mechanisms of acceleration and self-reinforcement are not unknown in economics and in political 
science. Brian Arthur presented a theoretical discussion on “dynamical systems of the self-reinforcing 
or autocatalytic type” both in the natural sciences and in economics. According to Arthur,  
self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics are related to four “generic sources”:  
- Large set-up or fixed costs, giving advantage to increasing economies of scale. 
- Learning effects, which act to improve products or lower their costs. 
- Coordination effects, which confer advantages to “going along” with other economic agents. 
- Adaptive expectations, where increased prevalence in the market enhances beliefs of further 
prevalence [1]. 
Arthur mentions “virtuous cycles” and the option of “strategic action” as well as the possible role of 
policy “to ‘tilt’ the market” toward certain dynamics [1]. He also mentions an important condition for a 
new equilibrium: “self-reinforcement (that) is not offset by countervailing forces” but supported by 
“local positive feedbacks” [1]. Although this is not extended and lacks discussion or empirical 
analysis, Arthur gives a remarkable early theoretical view of a phenomenon that has become highly 
important, particularly in environment and climate policy research. We will present empirical cases, 
which are compatible with the typology of his “generic sources”, but the picture is different if the 
mechanism of policy-feedback is included. 
Modern innovation research, particularly on eco-innovation, has brought new theoretical and 
empirical insights into the phenomenon of accelerated technical change [2–5]. Political science has 
added the dimension of policy feedbacks to the interpretation of interactive dynamics in modern  
policy-making [6,7]: Policies generate resources, incentives, and information for political actors, which 
can reinforce the policy. 
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The present author has contributed to this research by adding the policy cycle to the reinforcing 
cycles of market growth and innovation in an analytical model for the diffusion of clean energy 
technology [8]. The policy cycle (agenda setting-policy formulation-decision-implementation-policy 
outcome-evaluation-new agenda setting, etc.) is a mechanism of policy learning and change. It is 
particularly open to policy feedback, for instance if there are unexpected co-benefits of the policy. 
“Lesson-drawing” [9] is another potential mechanism of political reinforcement. It can support the 
diffusion of policy innovations, for instance if there is a certain “group dynamics” of countries:  
a collective learning leading to the broad adoption of a certain “trendy solution” [10]. 
There may be more types of acceleration. Economic but also regulatory competition [11] can 
reinforce the diffusion of goods or policies. Both economists and political scientists are familiar with 
the purposeful use of a window of opportunity [12]. Here we find an incidental convergence of 
“multiple streams” providing a situational opportunity for decision makers [13]. However, this does 
not necessarily produce a stable result. Windows of opportunity (such as the situation after the 
Chernobyl catastrophe) often close after a while. Therefore this type of acceleration is excluded from 
consideration here. This article deals with an accelerated transformation, i.e., change with stable  
long-term effects [7]. 
The diffusion of innovative low-carbon technologies and innovative supporting policies are 
typically interlinked. There is, however, no clear causal relationship, but a pattern of multiple 
interactions between technology and policy [14]. Policy can support the innovators of a low-carbon 
technology, and the innovators may provide new technology-based policy options for climate policy. 
Policy may act as a first mover, and its diffusion by lesson-drawing may support the diffusion of the 
technology. Often, the technological innovation comes first (as in the case of wind power) and 
governmental support can reinforce its success in national and global markets. In any case, the 
interaction between policy and technology can contribute to a reinforced diffusion of both the  
low-carbon technology and the supporting policy. This is a “coordination effect” in terms of Arthur’s 
classification [1]. 
In recent times there has been a rejuvenation of industrial policy [15,16]. It seems that green growth 
strategies and the designing of environmental and climate protection in terms of industrial policy are 
prominent examples of this tendency [17–20]. The translation of environmental and climate policy 
goals into the language of a technology-based economic strategy has become a success story in 
Germany and other countries such as China. Many governments regard themselves as actors in a 
highly competitive global market for clean technologies, in which innovation is considered the core of 
competitiveness [21,22]. From the perspective of climate policy this means that this policy has been 
able to mobilize economic interests. The following analysis will show that this ability can be observed 
at all levels of the global multi-level governance system. 
3. Interactive Cycles of Climate-Friendly Innovation 
It is a basic economic truth that growing markets induce demand for further innovation, which 
reduces production costs, improves the quality of the end-product and often reinforces market growth 
again. This is the learning effect in Arthur’s classification [1]. Markets for climate-friendly 
technologies, however, are characterized by the fact that they are typically policy-driven [23]. 
Energies 2015, 8 5785 
 
 
Therefore, a third dynamic mechanism is relevant: not only the market and the technical innovation 
cycle, but also the policy cycle (see also [24]). It is essentially a political learning process from 
agenda-setting and policy formulation to the final outcomes and their evaluation. 
Reinforcement by interactive cycles of low-carbon innovation can therefore be described as follows: 
- Ambitious targets based on a clean-energy innovation plus effective policy implementation. 
- Market growth of the supported clean-energy technology. 
- Induced technological learning (secondary innovation). 
- More ambitious targets: policy feedback from the new economic interests. 
It has been shown that cases of accelerated diffusion of low-carbon technologies can be explained 
by the interaction of the three cycles (Figure 1). The author has studied 15 empirical cases in which 
these kinds of dynamic interactions can be observed [8,21]. The example of green power in Germany 
alongside the successive increase of targets (2020) is shown in Figure 2. As in certain other cases, the 
policy starts with an ambitious target inducing an unexpected market growth, which again induces 
innovation and finally a positive policy feedback in the form of an increase in the policy’s targets. 
In 2000, the ambitious (and originally contested) German target was 20% green power by 2020. It was 
increased after nine years and again only one year later. The target for 2025 is now 40%–45%  
(compared with 1990). 
Even more remarkable is the example of wind and solar energy in China. The target for wind power 
to be installed by 2020 was several times increased, from 20 GW to 200 GW, due to an unexpected  
rapid diffusion. The example of installed PV capacity is shown in Figure 3. Here the target increased 
from 1.8 to 100 GW. 
 
Figure 1. Mutually reinforcing cycles of clean-energy innovation [8]. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Resources and Climate Change Mitigation has drawn the policy conclusion regarding the “virtuous 
cycles” of clean-energy innovation: “that long-term objectives for renewable energies and flexibility to 



























Figure 2. Share of green power 1998–2014 and targets for 2020/2025 in Germany  
(BMUB 2015). 
 
Figure 3. Installed PV capacity in China and targets for 2020 (Data basis REN21 2014). 
4. Enforced Diffusion from Pioneer Countries: Lead Markets and Political Lesson-Drawing 
A second mechanism of enforced diffusion is provided by national pioneers and trend setters [25]. 
The creation of a lead market for low-carbon technologies in a pioneer country together with political 
lesson-drawing [9] by other countries has been a prominent mechanism for the international diffusion 
of such technologies. Both mechanisms are independent, but they can reinforce each other. 
Enforced diffusion of clean-energy innovation by lead markets can be described as follows:  
- Lead markets are the national “runway” to start into the global market, where an innovative 
technology finds supportive conditions such as price, demand, or market structure. 
- National lead markets for clean-energy innovations are specific because they are “policy-driven” 
and provide a regulatory advantage by political support. 
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The economic mechanism is the enforced diffusion of climate-friendly technologies via lead 
markets. A national lead market is, according to Beise et al., “the core of the world market where local 
users are early adopters of an innovation on an international scale” [26]. Well-known general cases are 
lead markets for mobile phones (Scandinavia), fax (Japan) or the Internet (USA). They originated in 
markets with special market advantages, such as price, market structure, demand, or export advantages. 
Lead markets in pioneer countries have played a special role in the diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies. They re-financed the costs for technological learning until the product was sufficiently 
cheap and effective to diffuse into international markets. In addition, they had a demonstration effect 
showing how a certain climate-related problem could be solved, often including an economic 
advantage. This mechanism has become an important pathway for translating climate policy objectives 
into global markets. Examples encompass the development of wind power in Denmark and Germany, 
photovoltaic installations in Japan and Germany, heat pumps in Sweden, hybrid motors in Japan, and 
fuel-efficient diesel cars in Germany [26]. Examples for lead markets in emerging economies include 
solar water heating in China and bio-fuel technology in Brazil. 
Lead markets for climate-friendly technologies arise in countries with a “regulatory advantage” and 
a “transfer advantage” [27]. This means that the technology and their international diffusion are 
supported by policy [28]. “Lesson-drawing” by other countries supports policy diffusion. This political 
“lesson-drawing” is the second mechanism of reinforced international diffusion. In the context of lead 
markets it refers to the process of learning how to support markets for a specific climate-friendly 
technology and results in the diffusion of a specific supporting instrument or policy mix.  
Lesson-drawing is similar to Arthur’s mechanism of “adaptive expectations”—although it is policy 
learning. Similar to enforced technology diffusion, reinforced policy diffusion depends to a high 
degree on expectations, where increased prevalence in the global policy arena “enhances beliefs of 
further prevalence” [1]. 
Reinforced international diffusion by “lesson-drawing” can therefore be described as follows: 
- “Trendy solutions” of pioneer countries are adopted by other countries, e.g., as a strategy to 
avoid domestic trial-and-error. 
- “Adaptive expectations”: increased diffusion enhances beliefs in further diffusion. 
- Effect of “critical mass”, i.e., the stage in the process at which diffusion becomes self-perpetuating. 
The anticipated probability that a certain regulation will become an international standard  
(also supported by international harmonization) has become a strong driver of policy diffusion [29].  
A critical mass of countries adopting a certain trendy solution [10] reinforces the diffusion (see also [30]). 
At this stage, the process achieves sufficient momentum to become self-perpetuating. 
The speed of diffusion and lesson-drawing in technology-based climate policy has been in many 
cases remarkable. The diffusion of the instrument of feed-in tariffs may be used as an illustration 
(Figure 4 [31]). The diffusion of targets for green electricity occurred even faster. By early 2014,  
144 countries had introduced targets for green power, a number that doubled since 2007 [32].  
Even policies to support energy efficiency, which is often regarded as the more difficult part of climate 
policy, can have a high speed of international diffusion: out of 85 countries analyzed by the French 
institute ADEME, the share of countries with national targets for energy efficiency doubled within 
only five years to 80% [33]. This speed of diffusion is in clear contrast to the slow progress in 
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international climate negotiations. Lesson-drawing has been characterized as “governance by 
diffusion” [34]. It is remarkable that it is a completely voluntary process, significantly different from 
global climate governance through legally binding international obligations [22]. 
 
Figure 4. International diffusion of feed-in tariffs 1990–early 2013 (data basis [31]). 
A special reinforcement of a lead-market process takes places when feedback from the international 
markets occurs, which is driven by second-mover countries now entering the original lead market by 
successfully producing similar products at lower prices. The Chinese solar industry and its booming 
exports to Europe may be taken as an example [35]. The case marks a situation where a former lead 
market has to find a new role in the competition for innovation. This may create difficulties for the 
former pioneer. However, in terms of climate protection, this reinforcement of diffusion based on 
lower prices is a clear advantage. 
So far, lead markets in rich countries have provided the basis for clean technologies to diffuse from 
industrialized and emerging economies into international markets. A more recent development is the 
role of lead markets in emerging countries like India, where the lag markets are developing countries. 
Most interestingly for a sustainable energy future are lead markets for frugal innovations [36]. Frugal 
innovations are cheap, simple and robust. Beyond that they also try to save resources at all stages of 
the supply chain [37]. They are worth mentioning here, because, due to a generally low profit share, 
they depend on large-scale markets. The existence of such large markets in emerging economies can 
lead to the advantage of falling unit costs to increased output as a mechanism of reinforcement [1]. 
5. Multi-Level Governance: the Vertical Reinforcement of Horizontal Diffusion 
5.1. The Multi-Level System of Global Climate Governance 
Multi-level governance “characterizes the mutually dependent relationships—be they vertical, 
horizontal, or networked—among public actors situated at different levels of government” ([38], see 
also [39,40]). The multi-level perspective (MLP) is “a middle-range theory that conceptualizes overall 
dynamic patterns in socio-technical transitions” [41]. Multi-level reinforcement is a particularly 
interesting aspect (Figure 5). Schreurs and Tiberghien have used this terminology to explain the 
dynamics of climate policy in the European Union and its member states ([42], see also [43]). However, 
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it is also relevant in the global context. Here it is used to explain the dynamic interaction between the 









Figure 5. Multi-level governance: possible horizontal and vertical interactions. 
Multi-level governance—from the global to the local level—can be regarded as a general 
mechanism of reinforcement. The broad variety of possible vertical and horizontal interactions makes 
it possible that innovation take place at different parts of the governance system (Figure 5). 
Furthermore, they can be adopted in other parts of the system. Lesson-drawing (peer-to-peer learning) 
from pioneers is possible at all levels. Horizontal up-scaling of de-central innovations and best practice 
is another mechanism. The resulting policy of higher levels (nation state, the European Union) can 
stimulate horizontal dynamics at lower levels. This aspect of multi-level reinforcement will be 
exemplified by the case of the European Union. 
The multi-level system of climate governance is a global system because it has a global base of 
climate-related knowledge, motivation, and legitimacy. Moreover, it is a global system because a global 
market for climate-friendly technology has been established together with the global arena of climate 
policy. An important condition of its innovation dynamics is the leadership role of the higher levels. 
At each level of the multi-level system of global climate governance, a broad variety of motives and 
opportunities can be observed. At the level of provinces/regions or federal states, the following 
motives to support or to adopt climate-friendly technologies exist: rich regions can be motivated to 
transfer their successful economic policy to the new field of climate policy. Poor regions, on the other 
hand, can try to support renewable energies or energy-saving investments in the housing sector to 
overcome unemployment. Another driver may be opposition of the region against the national 
government (as in the case of Scotland, Quebec or California). Geographical advantage might provide 
another condition to support renewals (as with wind energy in coastal zones). Political scientists often 
point to the party constellation of a certain regional/state government [44]. In the EU, there are several 
responsibilities for climate and energy—beyond emission trading—at the regional level [45]. The EU 
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has a regional commissioner and a regional committee, which has recently issued a multi-level 
governance convention (2014). There exist international horizontal networks such as the R20 Regions, 
or the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development, which has been established at 
the World Summit in Johannesburg (2002). 
Cities and local communities have important responsibilities in policy areas that are relevant to 
climate policy. Housing and the energy consumption of households, transport regulations and 
infrastructures, land-use and urban planning, or waste policy are important policy fields in this regard. 
Most important is the responsibility for local energy supply, where cities in Europe or the US can have 
strong influence [38]. The fact that 80% of EU greenhouse gases emissions are related to urban 
activities illustrates the importance of the local level. Thus, cities are also important places for climate 
policy experiments and innovations [46]. Horizontally active international networks such as ICLEI or 
the Covenants of Mayors play an important role [47]. In addition, national networks such as the City 
Energy Project (USA) or the Chinese Low Carbon Eco-Cities Association can play a role [48]. The 
German “100%-Renewable Energy” network (Figure 6) is a remarkable example of horizontal 
dynamics at the lowest level being supported by climate policy activities at higher levels. 
Local climate mitigation and horizontal lesson-drawing between cities is being generally supported 
by the EU Commission and also by the central government in India and China. 
 
Figure 6. “100%-Renewable-Energy” Regions in Germany 2014 (2010) (Umwelt 12/2012, 
IdE 2015). 
5.2. Horizontal Dynamics Induced by Higher Levels 
The reinforcement at lower levels by multi-level governance can be described as follows: 
- Experimentation, innovation and best practice at different levels. 
- Local and regional best practice being scaled up and supported by the higher level. 
- Support from the higher level inducing horizontal dynamics at the lower level: pioneers 
become relevant as benchmark, partners or competitors. 
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Political leadership on the higher levels can impose the up-scaling and generalization of 
experiments, innovations and best practices from lower levels. If the higher levels take the lead, 
providing regulatory financial or informational support to the lower levels, they will strengthen the role 
of pioneers at the lower levels and induce horizontal lesson-drawing, cooperation, or competition at the 
same level (Figure 7). Pioneer cities or provinces/states at the lower levels become benchmarks for 
others. Support from above therefore provides new means and opportunities for the diffusion of 
climate-friendly innovation. From an economic perspective this includes the potential broadening of 
markets to a supra-regional scale. The mobilization of economic interests and the translation of climate 
policy goals into the language of market dynamics is an integrating common factor at all levels. 
 
Figure 7. Horizontal dynamics induced by the higher policy level. 
6. The Case of the European Union 
The EU has provided the best practice in climate mitigation and multi-level climate governance.  
As a regional system of climate governance it is unique compared with other world regions (NAFTA, 
African Union, ASEAN etc.). Regarding to the global 2° K target the achievements may not be 
sufficient. Nevertheless, they are remarkable because they have not been expected before. Greenhouse 
gases have been reduced by nearly 20% from 1990 to 2012. Moreover, the target for 2020 has already 
been nearly achieved (Figure 8). The accelerated speed of greenhouse gas reduction may be partly 
explained by the economic downturn. However, the diffusion of renewable energies had a similar 
tendency. By 2013 renewable energies accounted for 70% of new electric power capacity (Figure 9). 
One year later, the share was 79%—a significant increase from 57% only five years before [31,32]. 




Figure 8. EU-28 greenhouse gas emissions, 1990–2012 (EEA 2014). 
 
Figure 9. Green power as share of new power capacity, 2011–2013 [31]. 
The effect of the EU climate package (2008) cannot be disputed. It seems remarkable that this 
package was partly motivated by ideas of a policy-driven dynamic market for low-carbon 
technologies. Already in 2007, the EU Commission proposed a comprehensive lead market and 
innovation strategy “to create a virtuous cycle of growing demand, reducing costs by economies of 
scale, rapid product and production improvements and a new cycle of innovation that will fuel further 
demand and a spinout into the global market” [49]. After 2007 the European market was indeed the 
lead market for wind and solar power. Innovation and lesson-drawing took place at a high level 
throughout Europe. In some sense an interaction of the described mechanisms of reinforcement—a 
syndrome of reinforcement—could be observed at that time. Although the EU top level lost some of its 
dynamics in recent time, the European system of multi-level climate governance remained a strong 
driver for climate-friendly modernization [43]. This needs to be explained more broadly. 
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Multi-level climate governance was a purposeful strategy of the European institutions. There is a 
special institutional framework for regions/provinces and also a climate governance strategy for cities. 
Other characteristics of EU countries that provide a green opportunity structure include green political 
parties and public media. The EU has turned a “free market” into a market with strong environmental 
framework conditions. The World Bank recently confirmed that the EU has a specific “environmentally 
sustainable growth model” [50]. 
Beyond that there is a specific European mechanism of multi-level reinforcement: the interaction of 
national environmental policy innovation with the European harmonization mechanism in the context 
of the common market. The EU commission can under certain conditions authorize member states to 
maintain or introduce stricter measures of environmental policy. When a member state is authorized to 
do this, “the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an adaptation to that 
measure” (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 114.7; 193). Environmental policy 
innovation in member states can with a certain probability become a European regulation, which 
follows the principle of a “high level of environmental protection”. Climate policy is part of the EU 
environmental policy (Art 191). This mechanism can stimulate regulatory competition between 
member states to become the frontrunner of a European regulation [11,42]. It can be regarded as 
lesson-drawing by the EU Commission: learning from empirical best practice, avoiding time 
consuming experimentation and being supported by certain national governments, which can also 
provide competent advice. The UK emissions trading scheme (2002) can be taken as an example.  
It was also intended to deliver “first mover advantages” to UK companies before the introduction 
(2005) of the EU emissions trading scheme [51]. Other examples are the UK Energy Efficiency 
Commitment (2002) and the German Renewable Energy Law (2000), both being followed by EU 
Regulations (2001 and 2012). 
Climate policy as a process started in the EU at the national and sub-national level. Pioneer countries 
like Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (UK) generalized and integrated many political and 
economic experiments and best practices that had already taken place at lower levels, paving the way for 
their adoption at a higher level. Thus, the process of climate policy has moved bottom-up to the 
European and global levels. Extending the national policy innovations to the European Union has often 
been a governmental strategy of member states to stabilize the national pioneer role, but also to create a 
European market for domestic innovations in climate-friendly technologies. 
The Europeanization of climate policies was accompanied by the establishment of lobby 
organizations, which articulated an economic interest for clean energy at the EU level. Examples 
include the European Renewable Energy Council, the European Alliance to Save Energy, the European 
Insulation Manufacturers Association, Lighting Europe and the European Heat Pump Association. 
Meanwhile feedback can be observed at the local level, reinforcing earlier initiatives: cities and 
local communities, often organized as networks [47], use national and European policies and 
incentives—whether regulations, subsidies, or public procurement—to mobilize economic interests 
for climate-friendly technologies. These can be investments in the form of renewable energies or  
low-energy buildings. 
Most remarkable is the role of the Covenant of Mayors with about 6400 (2015) participating local 
communities. It was launched by the European Commission together with the EU climate and energy 
package in 2008. Within this network, the participating local authorities have to present action plans 
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and a GHG reduction target of at least 20%. The economic dimension is underlined by the fact that the 
European Investment Bank is involved in the financing of implementation measures. The Smart Cities 
Partnership Initiative of the EU Commission is a similar economic mechanism. The horizontal 
dynamics—particularly the competition between cities—are stimulated by an official Benchmark of 
Excellence, which is also a database of best practice [52]. 
Private ownership of green power seems to be a strong driver of change at the local level in several 
countries. In Germany, more than half of the green power installations are owned by private person. 
Europe, when compared with other global regions, has not only the advantage of a strong supra-national 
level of climate governance, but it also started early with a high proportion of decentralized and local 
ownership of green power installations (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 4/2014). 
It seems that the local level now has become the most dynamic driver of technical change towards a 
low-carbon energy system. An evaluation of the Covenant of Mayors shows that 63% of the local 
communities being assessed by the EU are planning to reduce GHG emissions by more than 20%.  
A reduction of about 370 million tons is expected by 2020 (ENDS Europe 24 June 2013). The database 
of the Covenant provides empirical evidence that in recent years, the climate policy process has 
mobilized strong economic interests at the local level, mainly in the building sector (44% of the 
activities) and in local energy production. 
The former policy initiative at the higher levels has created the necessary preconditions for this 
booming development at the sub-national level. The EU Directive on Energy Performance of 
Buildings, for instance, has stimulated a strong activity among local communities with pioneer cities 
such as Freiburg, Manchester, Copenhagen, and Malmö playing an important role. 
It seems that pioneer countries like Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom are also leading 
countries when local dynamics are concerned. These three countries have achieved the highest GHG 
reduction rates. They also have the most ambitious GHG reduction targets for the period 1990–2025 
(Germany 40%–45%, UK 50%; Denmark 40% by 2020). In all three countries this is the result of  
policy-induced reinforcing cycles of innovation and market growth with policy feedback. They are 
also cases of best practice regarding the mobilization of economic interests for climate governance at 
the sub-national level. 
7. The Advantage of a Polycentric Approach 
As we have seen, it is no disadvantage that the implementation of climate policy takes place under 
the condition of a broad variety of actors, dimensions, and levels. On the contrary: a “polycentric 
approach” [53] can be a real opportunity [54]. It should be mentioned that this polycentric approach 
includes not only governments and businesses, but also societal actors. Civil society—with networks of 
all kinds and at all levels of the multi-level game—seems to be the indispensable context of the energy 
transformation, although its highly complex causality is not easy to assess in terms of empirical research. 
The extremely high complexity of multi-level climate governance may cause the problem of final 
responsibility: if everybody is responsible, in the end there might be a situation in which nobody 
actually takes responsibility. So far, reaching a solution is still primarily the final responsibility of 
national governments acting within broad networks, often as collective players (e.g., G20). National 
governments, if compared with the small administration of global regimes, such as under the United 
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, have more human and financial resources. They 
can impose sanctions and penalties. They act under comparably higher pressure to provide legitimacy 
for their actions. They are the first responders in the event of extreme weather and other crises and they 
are observed more intensively by the public than government actors at other levels of the global  
multi-level governance system [21]. 
8. Conclusions 
This article has shown that the acceleration of the diffusion of clean-energy technologies is a 
potentially strong option for climate policy (see also [22]). As Arthur stated long ago, mechanisms of 
reinforcement can be found in natural as well as in economic systems. Although his typology was 
abstract and theoretical, it shows many similarities with the empirical dynamics in climate governance 
that have been presented in this paper. It is, however, necessary to include the role of government in 
this analytical perspective to explain the special dynamics of climate-related governance. 
Three mechanisms of reinforcement have been presented: (1) the dynamics of policy-driven domestic 
markets and innovation processes, that lead to a policy feedback, due to unexpected success but also due to 
the creation of a new interest base; (2) the dynamics of both the global climate policy arena and the global 
markets for clean-energy technologies: lead markets supported by country-to-country lesson-drawing; and 
(3) the dynamics of multi-level reinforcement, which is based on vertical and horizontal interaction 
and learning. It includes the up-scaling of decentralized innovations and the top-down implementation 
of climate policy measures on lower levels. In this paper we have focused on the horizontal dynamics 
of sub-national levels (such as networking, benchmarking, or competition between cities) being 
induced by top-down climate policy support. The three mechanisms are highly likely to support each 
other. In the EU they have sometimes (particularly after 2007) led to a syndrome of reinforcement. The 
list of possible accelerators may be longer than those presented. One additional likely mechanism of 
acceleration is the break-even point of simultaneously rising prices for fossil energy and the falling 
prices of renewable energies. 
It seems that the accelerators discussed can best be understood within the system of global  
multi-level climate governance. The governance system of the EU can be regarded as the most 
advanced sub-system. Meanwhile the multi-level system of global climate governance seems to have 
achieved its own inherent logic. It can be characterized by typical horizontal and vertical dynamics as 
well as long-term stabilization mechanisms, based on institutional change, new economic interests, and 
policy feedback. This governance system has created opportunities for innovation and its diffusion. The 
broad variety of agents and possible interactions (Figure 5) could be seen as one of its main 
characteristics. The interaction between levels is another one; such vertical interactions are often 
connected with horizontal dynamics at different levels: pioneer activities and lesson-drawing, 
networking, and cooperation, as well as competition. They have become increasingly important, 
particularly at the sub-national level (Figures 6 and 7). 
Several policy measures can be used to support this process and to stimulate acceleration, although 
a comprehensive strategy still needs to be developed. Thus far, these processes are mainly the result of 
an interactive learning-by-doing. The dynamics in most cases have been induced by competent 
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practitioners. This means that they are not the result of scientific design; instead, they are most often 
unintended and unexpected. 
The IPCC stated in its 5th Assessment Report that “…institutional and governance changes can 
accelerate a transition to low-carbon paths” [55]. However, there can be no doubt about the difficulty of 
translating the complex task of multi-level governance into a comprehensive strategy. There needs to be 
more research on best practices to draw better and more comprehensive conclusions for government 
strategies. The main general conclusions of this explorative analysis can be summarized as follows:  
1) Translating climate policy objectives into the language of industrial policy and ecological 
modernization [21] is a strong option for climate policy (while it is not the only solution,  
since there are limits to technological approaches). 
2) Ambitious goal-oriented climate policies can induce market growth and interactive technological 
learning (secondary innovation). Successful learning by doing, increased capacity, and the 
creation of new interests could lead to a policy feedback with even higher ambition. 
3) Multi-level governance is a highly important institutional opportunity structure for the 
innovation and diffusion of clean-energies and their supporting policies. Best practice can arise 
and lesson-drawing can take place at quite different points of the system of multi-level  
climate governance. 
4) Therefore base policy on existing best practices at different levels and provide channels for  
lesson-drawing and interactive learning. Apply ambitious but realistic targets and credible 
implementation programs. Raise ambitions and targets in cases of unexpected success. 
5) Give targeted support to sustainable R&D initiatives; use the lead market mechanism  
where possible. 
6) Support lower levels of government and stimulate horizontal dynamics through bench-marking, 
competition, lesson-drawing, cooperation, and networking. 
7) National governments—both as single and collective actors—so far exhibited the strongest 
capacities and therefore should lead with ambitious climate policies. 
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